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Abstract
The rationale of whole-farm insurance (WFI) is to pool all farm’s insurable risks into a single policy. This paper com-
pared separated multi-peril crop-specific insurance policies (CSI) with WFI. It first compared the loss ratios of frequent
buyers of agricultural insurance in Spain to confirm whether data provide support for combining separate premia in WFI
policies. Actuarial data showed that loss ratios are lower for farmers that sign up for different insurance groups or insure
more than one crop. Secondly, using the records of farmers who bought CSI for three crops during 1993-2004, Monte-
Carlo simulations were carried out to evaluate premium differences, revenue, and farmers’ utilities (DARA-CRRA) of CSI
and a WFI designed to cover the same risks than do the CSI policies. Results showed that premiums are reduced by 20%
and farmer’s certainty equivalents are slightly larger. Farmers would benefit from WFI and governments would enhance
the efficiency of their insurance subsidies.
Additional key words: agricultural insurance, crop risks, Monte-Carlo simulation, Spanish agriculture.
Resumen
Evaluación del potencial de seguros de explotación frente a seguros de cosecha
La ventaja de un seguro de explotación es agrupar todos los riesgos de una explotación en una prima única. En este
trabajo se compararon seguros multirriesgo de cultivo con seguros de explotación. Primero, se compararon los ratios de
pérdidas de usuarios frecuentes de seguros en España, con los que confirmar si los resultados actuariales aconsejan
agrupar las pólizas separadas en una de explotación que las englobe. De acuerdo con los registros de los seguros, se
demuestra que los ratios de pérdidas son significativamente menores para agricultores que contratan más de un seguro.
En segundo lugar, se utilizaron los registros de agricultores que contrataron seguros de cosecha para tres cultivos entre
1993-2004, para realizar simulaciones Monte-Carlo al objeto de evaluar las diferencias de prima, ingreso y utilidad de
los agricultores. Bajo el supuesto de aversión absoluta al riesgo decreciente y aversión relativa al riesgo constante, se
pudo comparar las opciones de asegurar los cultivos por separado o agrupados en una prima única de seguro de explo-
tación. En este caso, se diseñó para proporcionar la misma garantía que separadamente proporcionan los seguros de
cosecha. Los resultados revelan que la prima sería un 20% menor y el equivalente cierto ligeramente superior. De esta
forma los productores se beneficiarían del seguro de explotación y las subvenciones públicas del seguro serían más efi-
cientes. 
Palabras clave adicionales: agricultura española, riesgos de cosechas, seguro agrario, simulación Monte-Carlo.
Abbreviations used: AGR (adjusted gross revenue), CAIS (Canadian Agriculture Income Stabilization), CE (certainty equivalents), CRC
(crop revenue coverage), CSI (crop-specific insurance), CV (coefficient of variation), DARA – CRRA (Decreasing absolute risk aversion
– Constant relative risk aversion), ENESA (Spanish Insurance Agency), FII (farm income insurance), GRIP (Group Risk Income Protec-
tion), IP (income protection), MCI (multi-crop insurance), NISA (Net Income Stabilization Account), NMI (Whole Farm Negative Mar-
gin Insurance Pilot Program), RA (revenue assurance), WFI (whole-farm insurance).
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Introduction 
Whole-farm insurance policies are meant to provide
overall coverage to all farms’ crops. Since most crop
risks do not perfectly covariate, whole-farm insurance
(WFI) provides a more efficient coverage than insuring
each crop or animal with a specific policy. This is
because WFI provides coverage for the whole farm’s
revenue or margin, which are good proxies of farmers’
profitability. Its rationale is based on simple diversifica-
tion and portfolio management (Mahul and Wright,
2003). Following Hennessy et al. (1997), if a farm
grows two crops, A and B, a policy insurance based on
the farm’s total revenue will be cheaper than the sum of
the premia of two individual insurances for crops A and
B which provides the same expected revenue; the sav-
ings being inversely proportional to the correlation
between contemporaneous crops’ revenues. In principle,
the lower is the correlation, the greater the premium
rebate that WFI results over crop-specific insurance
(CSI). 
WFI has been developed and applied following two
different formats. First, farm income insurance (FII)
provides coverage against farm’s margin losses. In the
examples that will be briefly reviewed, farmers can pur-
chase insurance against reduced or negative margins,
evaluated accordingly with certain cost and revenue
accountant rules. With the second format, farmers can
purchase multi-crop insurance (MCI) policies (or port-
folio insurance for other authors). These result from a
combination of multiple-peril, yield or revenue crop-
specific insurance, in such a way that the combined rev-
enue coming from the eligible crops is guaranteed
against any source of losses. If all farm’s crops would be
included in the MCI, and this would provide coverage
not only for crops’ revenue but also for crops’ income,
then MCI would be equivalent to FII.
The main disadvantage of FII stems from the require-
ment to measure the farm’s revenue or margin in a man-
ner that avoids moral hazard and is acceptable for insur-
ers. As a result, WFI is more often developed along the
MCI format, but there are also examples of FII that will
be reviewed in the following section.
Using Monte-Carlo simulations, Hennessy et al.
(1997) show that MCI provides a similar, albeit cheaper
revenue protection than insuring corn (Zea mays L.) and
soybeans (Glycine max L.) with separate premia for the
case of an Iowa representative farm. Babcock and Hayes
(1999) show that a corn and soybeans producer could
purchase relatively cheaper insurance for the same crops
if the policy includes coverage against revenue losses in
hogs’ production. Hart et al. (2003) developed several
whole-farm crop revenue insurance programs to include
livestock. Their whole-farm insurance product covered
crop revenues from corn and soybeans and livestock
revenues from pig production. They found that at cover-
age levels of 95% or lower, the fair insurance premiums
for this product offered to an Iowa pig farm are much
lower than the fair premia for the corn alone on the same
farm.
From an actuarial point of view, the premium reduc-
tion that is achieved by WFI is based on pooling the
risks of the crops included in the policy. For the insuree,
this means that the distribution of pay-offs will be more
concentrated around the mean, reducing the size of both
tails. As the negative outcome of one crop may be fully
compensated by the positive one of another crop, WFI
may not yield any indemnity in cases where specific-
crop premia might do so. Yet, if government subsidizes
the premia, the efficiency of support, in terms of
increase of certainty equivalent per euro spent in subsi-
dies, may be significantly larger with WFI than with
crop-specific premia.
To evaluate the benefits of WFI for a farmer that
grows and purchases insurance for more than one crop,
one has to assume that he/she would maintain the same
acreage allocations, because WFI premia and outcomes
depend on them. In addition, as the distribution of ben-
efits exhibit a reduction of mean-preserving spread,
WFI would only appeal to risk-averse farmers. Further,
since total liability is reduced with WFI with respect to
specific-crop insurance for the same coverage, re-insur-
ance may be less costly.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate WFI poli-
cies of the MCI type for farmers that have shown con-
sistent and sustained crop-specific insurance strategies.
Using the farm-level records of the Spanish Insurance
Agency (ENESA) for 12 years (1993-2004), two sepa-
rate analyses were conducted to evaluate the potential of
WFI. First, comparisons were made between the loss
ratios of frequent buyers of insurance, who are grouped
accordingly to their insurance strategies. To our knowl-
edge, this is first the time individual loss ratios are used
to conduct an evaluation of agricultural insurance,
except for Garrido and Zilberman (2008) who used the
same database used in this work. In the second
approach, an evaluation of the premium of WFI was car-
ried out for farmers who have purchased more than one
crop-specific multiple-peril policy. The comparisons of
total paid premium and farmers’ revenue and utility,
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CAIS, the heir of the old Net Income Stabilization
Account (NISA), is not an insurance-type mechanism,
and fits better with the notion of self-insurance funds, to
which both Provincial and Federal governments match
the growers’ contributions (Government of British
Columbia, 2005a). In the Canadian self-insurance
funds, growers can make withdrawals from their indi-
vidual accounts when their farms’ margins fall below
the reference margin. In contrast with insurance-type
mechanisms, making withdrawals is optional to the
farmers, which may provide a smoother flow of revenue
and better adaptation to farmers’ needs (Turvey et al.,
1997). The CAIS program is currently in evolution, but
the fact that is based on the farm’s income (production
margin) remains unchanged. Since 2001, hog farms and
horticultural farms from the Province of British Colum-
bia can purchase Whole Farm Negative Margin Insur-
ance Pilot Program (NMI). This program guarantees
subscribers complete recovery of their production costs,
in case of low product prices, crop losses or unexpected
increase of input costs (Government of British Colum-
bia, 2005b). 
In Spain, there are various WFI, all of them devel-
oped under the format of MCI insurance. Yield and
multi-peril WFI policies are offered for field crops
farms, differentiating dry-land crops and irrigated
crops. Another group of WFI policies is targeted to fruit
producers, so that all fruit species, excluding citrus, are
included in the same the policy. Citrus specific multi-
crop and vegetables specific multi-crop policies provide
coverage against multiple perils including hailstorm,
freeze, flood, persistent rain, strong winds and fire. 
The Spanish Insurance system has thus expanded
from CSI policies, grouping them in MCI policies of
increasing complexity and coverage variations. This
work deals with some of them, looking in more detail at
a combination of crops for which there are not WFI
policies offered yet. 
Analysis of actuarial data of Spanish
frequent buyers of insurance
This section shows the comparison of average loss
ratios of Spanish farmers that have shown distinctive
and consistent insurance strategies during the period
1993-2004. An evaluation of the potential of WFI can be
made by grouping farmers accordingly with the type of
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with WFI and with various insurance policies, were
based on Monte-Carlo simulations, using probability
density functions evaluated from ENESA records. WFI
was designed to deliver exactly the same expected rev-
enue than does the combined effects of three crop-spe-
cific multiple-peril insurance policies, providing cover-
age for the same risks. In contrast with previous work,
the possibility of damages not covered by the insurance
policy was taken into account considering three stochas-
tic effects: crops’ yields, the magnitude of the indemni-
ties and the probability of experiencing crop losses or
failures due to non-insurable risks. The parameters of
these distributions are estimated from actual data per-
tained to the selected farmers and to their comarcas (as
counties are called in Spain).
Previous experiences with whole-farm insurance
Since 1996, various models of revenue insurance have
been developed in USA. Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC)
and Income Protection (IP) were initiated in 1996; Rev-
enue Assurance (RA) became available in 1997; and
Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) was marketed in
1999 for the first time. Until 1999, the only revenue
insurance available for the whole-farm was a variant of
RA (Babcock and Hayes, 1999). For this, actuarially fair
premia were evaluated using a similar procedure as that
developed by Hennessy et al. (1997), giving it a format
of portfolio insurance providing a coverage against rev-
enue losses1. In 2000 a new revenue WFI policy, Adjust-
ed Gross Revenue (AGR), was offered. It is FII-type pol-
icy, but it provides coverage against losses below the
average farm “gross revenue” of the previous five years,
which include sales from crops, livestock, or fish-farm
production (within some limits) together with other farm
income. It was initially offered experimentally in North-
east States, but presently is eligible for farmers of West
Coast and Idaho (USDA, 2005a). Since 2004, AGR-Lite
is offered in eleven Northeast States. It includes all rev-
enues originating from the same crops eligible with
AGR, plus livestock (with no limits) and horticultural
crops. It was especially designed for medium-size and
small farms, since total liabilities can not exceed
$250,000 (USDA, 2005b). 
In Canada, Canadian Agriculture Income Stabiliza-
tion (CAIS) was initiated in 2003, integrating all avail-
able programs and income stabilization instruments.
1 This RA variant is commercially offered by American Farm Bureau Insurance Services, Inc., in six midwestern US States.
purchased insurance and the number of insured crops. If
the loss ratios of frequent purchasers are lower with
more diverse insurance strategies in terms of groups and
crops then a policy of type WFI that combines them all
in a single policy should be cheaper.
From a selection of 55,300 farmers of seven Spanish
agriculturally diverse comarcas (similar to US coun-
ties), subsets of farmers formed meeting two criterions.
First, farmers must have purchased any type of insur-
ance in at least nine of 12 years (1993-2004). Second,
they must follow the same insuring strategy for at least
eight out of the 12 years. This means that subsets are
formed with farmers who purchased the same number
and group of policies in almost all years. ‘Insurance
group’ refers to insurance policies that can be applied to
similar crops providing the same type of coverage. An
example of group is ‘yield insurance for all winter cere-
als’, that is, a group which may encompass several crops
for which farmers can insure against common risks.
Subsets of farmers were also created with farmers that
consistently purchased any type of insurance based on
the number of insured crops. As a result of these strin-
gent conditions the size of the subsets was significantly
reduced, but the comparisons of loss ratios across
groups became more robust. The size of subsets varied
between 5 and 4091 farmers. 
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Table 1 reports two blocks of means comparison tests
of loss ratios evaluated in 2004 for the period 1993-
2004 across subsets of farmers. In the first set of tests a
comparison within groups is made, distinguishing farm-
ers who contracted only one crop from others that
insured two or more crops of the same group. Then
mean comparison tests were performed for groups 1 and
2. Results show that loss ratios of the farmers that pur-
chased only one crop are significantly higher than those
that purchased at least two crops. 
In the second block of tests, subsets are based just on
the number of crops that were insured, no matter what
type of insurance was contracted. Results show that for
pairwise comparisons insuring more crops is always
accompanied by significantly lower loss ratios. Overall,
loss ratios tend to be lower when farmers exhibit more
diverse insuring strategies both within groups and by
the number of insured crops. This provides actuarial
support for offering farmers WFIs that combine their
multiple policies at a lower price.
The modeling framework
The modeling framework includes the evaluation of
CSI premium and the WFI premium for a number of
1 Pairwise means comparisons with t-test with unequal variances. 2 SD, standard deviation. Source: ENESA records of all farmers of seven Span-
ish comarcas who purchased any insurance in at least 10 years during the period 1993-2004.
Comparisons within groups
Mean SD2 No. farmers p-value
Group 1 (1 crop) 0.868 0.779 3022 <0.01
Group 1 (2 crops) 0.697 0.542 1570 <0.01
Group 2 (1 crop) 0.541 0.77 243 <0.01
Group 2 (2 crops) 0.42 0.296 27 <0.01
Comparisons by number of insured crops
1 crop 0.844 0.856 4091 <0.01
2 crops 0.657 0.531 488 <0.01
1 crop 0.844 0.856 4091 <0.01
3 crops 0.567 0.4062 133 <0.01
2 crops 0.657 0.532 488 <0.01
3 crops 0.567 0.406 133 <0.01
1 crop 0.844 0.856 4091 <0.01
4 crops 0.678 0.478 129 <0.01
Table 1. Comparisons1 of average loss ratios (1993-2004) among Spanish farmers with frequent agricultural insurance partic-
ipation
representative growers who exhibit consistent and stable
insuring strategies based on various CSI policies. 
Let’s suppose that a farmer grows N crops, each crop
i with a yield probability distribution function of fi(xi ).
The actuarially fair premium for a multi-peril crop-spe-
cific insurance policy for each crop Pri would be esti-
mated by:
where Ii is the indemnity of crop i; E[.] is the mathemat-
ical expectation operator; Xi is the guaranteed yield for
crop i; xi is the stochastic yield; pi is the crop price at
which crop losses are paid, assumed non-stochastic; li is
the stochastic loss eligible for indemnity (which does not
always correspond with the loss of the farmer), and λi
gives the probability of getting an indemnity when yields
are below the insured level. Essentially, what variable λi
does is to capture the event of experiencing low yields for
a reason that does (λi=1) or does not (λi=0) lead to an
indemnity, as defined by the insurance policy.
For the WFI policy, fair premium should result from:
where R, which is farm-specific, is the insured revenue.
It is equal to the expected revenue that the farm would
obtain should all crops be insured with crop-specific
policies, that is:
In the above formulation, note that Pr is idiosyncrat-
ic to the farmer because the cropping patterns, si, are
needed to compute it. Furthermore, since the crops’
yields functions are in principle not independent, the
numerical computation of Pr and Pri needs also the cor-
relations among random variables li and xi.
The savings in terms of insurance costs for the same
expected revenue can be measured by: ∆Pr=Pr– Σ si Pri. 
In addition, utility gains can be evaluatedwith ∆EU =
= EU(πWFI)-EU(πCSI), where π accounts for the farm
profits with the different insurance possibilities, U(π) is
DARA – CRRA utility function, such as U(π)=π1-r/
(1-r), with r being the coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion. Similarly, the difference of Certainty Equivalents
was also computed from ∆CE = CE(πWFI)-CE(πCSI).
Note that, by the very definition of WFI, the differ-
ence of expected profits ∆π e = π eWFI – π eCSI = 0, because: 
where Ci is crop i’s cost. Both results are equal to the
implicit insured revenue (R) minus the crops’ produc-
tion costs, because premium was considered actuarially
fair.
Let’s observe in Eq. [2] that: (i) when there is no loss,
the final yield is xi; (ii) when there is an eligible loss 
(λi = 1), the final yield is the guaranteed yield Xi; and
(iii), when the loss is not eligible for an indemnity (λi =
0), yield would be equal to xi (with xi < Xi). Note also in
Eq. [2] that variable λi only applies when xi < Xi.
Assumptions and data
With the above stylized model, a three-crop whole-
farm insurance was designed for a combination of crops
typical in insured farmers from Comarca Val d’Albaida
(Valencia, Eastern Spain): a) Irrigated apricot (Prunus
armeniaca L.); b) Irrigated plums (Prunus domestica
L.); c) Non-irrigated wine grapes (Vitis vinifera L.). The
existing crop-specific insurance policies for those crops
provide coverage against hailstorms, torrential flood-
rain, persistent rain, strong winds, frost, and, only for
wine grapes, the risk of premature physiological
ripeness. WFI policy is designed to provide coverage for
the same risks that the current single-crop insurance
policies actually cover. This means that they are not
yield insurance but multiple-peril insurance.
The simulation and numerical study was carried out
for two representative farmers of Val d’Albaida. The
data base originates from ENESA’s individual farmers
records for the seasons 1993 to 2004. The two represen-
tative farmers were selected from ENESA’s records
amongst those farmers that purchased the three CSI




































































































policies corresponding to the crops mentioned above.
The selection was based on the criterion of having pur-
chased insurance for the three considered crops during
10 out of the 12 considered seasons. 
Yet, premium (Pri and Pr) have been evaluated taking
into account all farmers within the Comarca Val d’Albai-
da who purchased the same three insurance policies at
least one of the 12 seasons, and at least one policy in 10
out of the 12 seasons. This allowed for pooling together a
much larger data set from which some of the parameters
of the distribution functions of xi, li and λi could be esti-
mated. From the records available, it was found that
yields (xi) and eligible losses (li ) follow beta distribution
functions. The loss eligibility parameter (λi) yields 0 or 1
from a binomial distribution function, whose frequency is
obtained from the data. For each of the two selected farm-
ers, it was taken their individual average yields, but both
the maximum and the coefficient of variation (CV) of the
crop yields, as well as the correlations were taken from
the larger data set containing all comarca’s farmers who
grow the same crops. They are shown on Table 2. From
the same larger dataset was estimated the distribution
function parameters of eligible losses, li, expressed by the
indemnities in relative terms over the liabilities of crop i
(also shown on Table 2), the correlations of yields and
losses among the crops (on the bottom part of Table 2),
and lastly, the frequency of the binomial function of loss-
es λi. It was estimated from the frequency of indemnities
over total observations, and was found to be 0.20, 0.23
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and 0.09 for apricots, plums and wine grapes respective-
ly. This frequency was doubled to account for its use only
on the left half of the distribution (when yields are lower
than the average/guaranteed yield). Table 2 also reports
the correlation matrix.
The insured acreage, si, is taken from the two farm-
ers’ in season 2000. Crop price, pi, is the 5-year average
of the prices used by ENESA to compute the indemni-
ties during the seasons 2000 through 2004. Regarding
the insurance coverage level, the level offered in season
2004 was taken which amounts to 100% of expected
yield (in prior seasons it has been 80% for some of the
crops). No production costs were included in the calcu-
lations, so benefits are in fact revenue measures. Lastly,
the DARA-CRRA function assumes a relative risk aver-
sion level of r=1.2, although sensitivity analyses that
assume greater risk aversion preferences will also be
reported. 
The premium, Pr and Pri, together with the above
mentioned measures of benefits were obtained from
Monte-Carlo simulations, using the Latin Hypercube
sampling of @Risk (Palisade Decision Tools).
Results
Table 3 reports the average results of the CSI and the
WFI cases for farms 1 and 2. For both farms, WFI
ensures slightly better average results than CSI. With
1 CV, coefficient of variation. 2 F1, Farm 1. F2, Farm 2.
Yields apricot Yields plums Yields wine Losses apricot Losses plums Losses wine
grapes grapes
CV1 0.30 0.39 0.16 0.70 0.72 0.60
Mean2 F1: 15603 F1: 7224 F1: 12305.92
F2: 6564 F2: 8226 F2: 13419.89
0.24 0.21 0.37
Max / min 28086 / 0 14808 / 0 18750 / 0 1 / 0 1 / 0 1 /0
Correlation matrix of li and xi
Yields - apricot 1
Yields - plums 0.173 1
Yields - grapes 0.550 0.289 1
Losses - apricot -0.073 0.087 -0.148 1
Losses - plums 0.017 0.095 0.028 0.471 1
Losses - grapes 0.140 -0.054 0.030 1 0.060 1





about the same expected revenue, the Certainty Equiva-
lent improves moving from CSI to WFI. The WFI pre-
mia, as expected, would be significantly reduced with
respect to the CSI case, the reductions being 19% for
farm 1 and 15.5 % for farm 2. 
Figures 1a and 1b graph the density functions of both
farms’ revenues for the three-case analyses. In both
cases, insurance reduces the spread of the results with
respect to the no-insurance case. Yet, the differences
between the CSI and WFI cases are only significant for
results near the average, as WFI concentrates more
probability around the mean than CSI. This is because
of the risks’ compensation effect that WFI has embed-
ded on its actuarial evaluation. In this sense, moving
from CSI to WFI represents a reduction of a mean-pre-
serving spread, as defined by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970), but does not contribute to reduce the probabili-
ty of the left tail. The factor explaining this left tail is
that there are some risks for which the CSIs do not pro-
vide coverage. Recall that this feature is modeled by
means of the stochastic variable λi. As WFI exactly
reproduces the same coverage and loss adjustment than
does CSI, the left probability tail is neither effectively
reduced by WFI.
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Crop- Whole-
Wine specific farm Differences
Apricot Plums grapes insurance insurance (WFI-CSI)
(CSI) (WFI)
Farm 1
Surface (ha) 0.77 0.88 1.44 3.09 3.09
Pure premium (%) 5.00 4.48 3.15 4.04 3.32 -0.72
Liability (€) 3948.08 2174.52 4841.74 10964.35 10964.35 0.00
Pure premium (€) 193 96 154 443 358 -85.00
Expected revenue (€) 10762.00 10762.76 0.76
Certainty equivalent (€) 10536.00 10546.10 10.10
Farm 2
Surface (ha) 0.75 2.82 0.63 4.2 4.2
Pure premium (%) 4.92 4.40 3.04 4.19 3.55 -0.64
Liability (€) 1617.68 7935.23 2310.01 11862.92 11862.92 0.00
Pure premium (€) 81 345 71 497 420 -77.00
Expected revenue (€) 11691.77 11691.02 -0.75
Certainty equivalent (€) 11110.37 11127.02 16.65
Table 3. Comparison of the crop-specific insurance (CSI) and whole-farm insurance (WFI) results



















































No insurance CSI Insurance WFI Insurance
Farm 2
Figure 1. Density functions for revenues of farmers 1 (a) and 2 (b). CSI, Crop specific insurance. WFI, Whole-farm insurance
~
Slight stochastic dominance of WFI over CSI is shown
on the utility measures graphed in Figures 2a and 2b. The
differences of WFI and CSI are marked right beyond the
Utility values where the cumulative distributions of both
insurances’ graphs cross the no-insurance case. The kink
in the WFI curves corresponds to the spike of the density
functions shown on Figures 1a and 1b.
In a final set of results, the effects of various risk aver-
sion levels were simulated on the certainty equivalents of
the three-case results. Figure 3 shows that certainty
equivalents are quite similar for low to medium risk
aversion rates, and do not differ significantly for differ-
ent levels of risk aversion, confirming a result widely
found in the literature (Lien and Hardaker, 2001).
Concluding remarks
Whole-farm insurance (WFI) can provide welfare-
increasing outcomes with respect to crop-specific insur-
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Figure 3. Certainty equivalents for both farms and six levels of relative risk aversion coefficients. No-Ins, no insurance case. CSI,
crop specific insurance. WFI, whole-farm insurance.
ance (CSI), for the same coverage-guarantees and
expected revenue levels. It was found that loss rations of
farmers that exhibit more diverse insurance estrategies,
either in types of policies or number of insured crops, are
lower than those with less insured crops. The simulation
worked in a more detailed and specific setting illustrated
another advantage of WFI over CSI, that is that WFI con-
centrated more probability mass around the mean than
does CSI. Yet, the differences among WFI and CSI can
be small if: a) the left-tails are unaffected by moving
from CSI to WFI, because only insurable risks are cov-
ered; b) the correlation among all crops’ yields and loss-
es are small or positive; and c) for low levels of risk aver-
sion. In fact, WFI provides a gain if and only if farmers
exhibit a certain level of risk aversion.
It was shown that fair premium could be reduced by 15
to 20% with WFI with respect to the situation of a set of
crop-specific insurance policies. As governments typical-
ly subsidize premia based on a proportion of their value,
subsidies could be reduced significantly without impair-
ing the risk reduction potential granted to the farmers. 
There is an additional potential advantage of WFI
over CSI that it was not addressed in this paper. It is fair
to assume that farmers only claim indemnities when
they expect that the loss adjuster would approve it. As a
result, it is very likely that WFI’s administrative costs
may be lower than with CSI, because farmers would not
be interested in reporting losses in one crop when they
expect that favorable results from others make up for the
losses of the failed one. Should this be the case, lesser
loss adjustment costs would also be another advantage
of WFI over CSI.
Among some of the disadvantages of WFI is the need
to compute individual premia for each farmer and to
recompute them every year that the cropping pattern
changes. Also, Dismukes and Coble (2006) argue that
WFI is more difficult to administer than CSI. Yet, with
good information technology systems, this needs not
represent a major obstacle. 
Acknowledgments
A preliminary version of this article was presented at
26th Conference of the International Association of
Agricultural Economists, Queensland, Australia in
August 2006. The Spanish Agency of Agricultural
Insurance (ENESA) generously provided the data, mul-
tiple clarifications about Spanish agricultural insurance
and long-term research funding.
References
BABCOCK B.A., HAYES D.J., 1999. Whole-farm revenue
insurance for crop and livestock producers. Center for
Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD), Iowa State
University, Ames, Iowa, USA.
DISMUKES R., COBLE K.H., 2006. Managing risk with rev-
enue insurance. AmberWaves 4, 22-27.
GARRIDO A., ZILBERMAN D., 2008. Revisiting the
demand for agricultural insurance: The case of Spain. Ag
Fin Rev 68, 43-66.
GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, 2005a. 2005
CAIS Interim Applications. Available in http://
www.agf.gov.bc.ca/finance/CAISprogram/backgrounder.h
tm, [August 22, 2005].
GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, 2005b. Nega-
tive Margin Insurance Pilot Program in British Columbia.
Available in http://www.agf.gov.bc.ca/finance/arm/nmi/
nmitoc.htm#policyword, [August 22, 2005].
HART C.E., HAYES D.J., BABCOCK B.A., 2003. Insuring
eggs in baskets. Center for Agricultural and Rural Devel-
opment (CARD), Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa,
USA.
HENNESSY D.A., BABCOCK B.A., HAYES D.J., 1997.
Budgetary and producer welfare effects of revenue insur-
ance. Am J Agr Econ 79, 1024-34.
LIEN G., HARDAKER J.B., 2001. Whole-farm planning
under uncertainty: impacts of subsidy scheme and utility
function on portfolio choice in Norwegian agriculture. Eur
Rev Ag Econ 28, 17-36.
MAHUL O., WRIGHT B., 2003. Designing optimal crop rev-
enue insurance. Am J Agr Econ 85, 580-589.
ROTHSCHILD M., STIGLITZ J.E., 1970. Increasing risk: I.
A definition. J Econ Theor 2, 225—243.
TURVEY C., MEILKE K., WEERSINK A., CHEN K.,
SARKER R., 1997. The transfer efficiency assessment of
individual income-based whole farm support programs.
Technical Paper 5-95, Farm Management Solutions Inc.
and The Department of Agricultural Economics and Busi-
ness, The University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada.
Available in http://www4.agr.gc.ca/resources/prod/doc/
pol/pdf/transfer_e.pdf [June 1, 2008].
USDA, 2005a. USDA Announces Expansion of Whole Farm
Insurance Pilot Program. Risk Management Agency Program
Announcement. Available in http://www.rma.usda.gov/
news/pr/2000/001218.html, [August 22, 2005]. 
USDA, 2005b. Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite Whole Farm
Insurance Program Now Available to Underserved States.
Available in http://www.rma.usda.gov/news/pr/2003/11/
1110agr-lite.html, [August 22, 2005]. 
Whole-farm insurance over crop-specific insurance 11
